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Imposing Liability on Drug Testing
Laboratories for "False Positives": Getting
Around Privity
Karen Manfieldt
Many employers today require that prospective or current
employees submit to drug testing as a condition of employment.1
Although public policy favors a drug-free workplace,2 drug testing
of workers faces criticism because it may violate a worker's pri-
vacy,3 because it reflects drug use off the job that may not impair
the worker's ability to do her job,4 and because the procedure
may cause unnecessary emotional distress.5 In addition to these
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A recent American Management Association ("AMA") survey shows that 87.2 per-
cent of its member firms have drug testing programs; the AMA consists primarily of
larger companies, but its results suggest that more than a third of all newly hired indi-
viduals in 1994 will undergo drug testing. Bob Condor, More Jobs Are Hanging On Drug-
Test Results: About 33% of New Hires Can Expect to Be Checked, Study Says, Chi Trib C1
(Apr 11, 1994). In addition, a recent study found that 90 percent of Fortune 1000 compa-
nies have drug testing programs. The Week In Healthcare, Modern Healthcare 36 (Aug 3,
1992). The Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that 67 percent of companies with five
thousand or more workers have implemented drug testing. Rob Brookler, Industry Stan-
dards in Workplace Drug Testing, Personnel J 128 (Apr 1992). However, the numbers are
probably lower for smaller companies; a 1989 Bureau of Labor Statistics study found that
only 20 percent of workers are employed by companies with drug testing programs. US
Dept of Labor, Survey of Employer Anti-Drug Programs, 760 (BLS 1989), cited in Craig
Zwerling, James Ryan, and Endel John Orav, The Efficacy of Preemployment Drug
Screening for Marijuana and Cocaine in Predicting Employment Outcome, 264 JAMA
2639 (1990). Since only 20 percent of all workers are employed by companies with drug
testing programs, and since 33 to 90 percent of all large employers test, the statistics
suggest that drug testing is being used primarily by large employers.
' The National Institute on Drug Abuse ("NIDA") estimates costs of drug use as high
as sixty billion dollars. Ira A. Lipman, Fight Drugs With Workplace Tests, NY Times sec 3
at 15 (July 18, 1993). These costs result in part from the increased likelihood of tardiness,
absenteeism, and workplace injury typical of recreational drug users. Id. Workers as well
as employers favor drug testing because it facilitates a safer workplace; one study found
that 97 percent of workers polled believe that drug testing is appropriate, and 26 percent
consider it a necessity. Id. See also Andrew E. Floren, Urine Drug Screening and the
Family Physician, Am Family Physician 1441 (May 1994).
' See, for example, Judith Wagner DeCew, Drug Testing: Balancing Privacy and
Public Safety, 24 Hastings Ctr Rpt 17 (Mar-Apr 1994).
' In one case, a woman tested positive who had used marijuana three months earlier
at a party. Chris Spolar, Electronics Technician, Montana: Did Two Puffs Cut Short a
New Career?, Wash Post A14 (Dec 6, 1988). No test can determine whether a worker has
been under the influence of drugs while at work.
Charles J. Dangelo, Comment, The Individual Worker and Drug Testing: Tort Ac-
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problems, drug testing may result in a "false positive," which oc-
curs when a test yields a positive test result even though the
worker has not used drugs in the period measured: by the test.'
False positives arise in a small but significant number of cases,
yet they can have devastating results for their victims, such as
the loss of both current and prospective employment. Defenders
of drug testing argue that the majority of workers benefit from a
safer and more productive workplace, and that the increased
safety and productivity is advantageous to employers. Even if
these claims are correct, however, workers who experience false
positives suffer from the absence of adequate safeguards against
false positives and from the inability to secure compensation for
their injuries.
Over the past decade, a number of victims of false positives
have sued the parties responsible for administering the tests be-
cause the victims' employment was terminated on the basis of
false positive test results. These plaintiffs have found themselves
in a legal nowhere land, with no clear remedy and little prece-
dent to guide their legal actions. They have tried a variety of
causes of action, ranging from simple negligence to product li-
ability. Most courts have rejected these plaintiffs' claims for
product liability, breach of contract, and defamation, but the
courts have disagreed about whether a testing laboratory owes a
general duty of reasonable care to these workers.8
The courts that have addressed the problem of false positives
have reached inconsistent holdings, without adequately explain-
ing their results or responding fully to opposing arguments.
Courts finding liability have applied a simple negligence stan-
dard, using a balancing test to determine whether a duty of care
should exist. While the judges in these cases reach the right re-
sult, they appear to do so on the basis of their gut reactions to
the plight of the plaintiff, while ignoring concerns about effi-
ciency and precedent. Because these courts do not even consider
possible objections to their position, the resulting decisions have
failed to persuade more skeptical courts that testing laboratories
ought to be held liable.
Courts that have refused to find liability have done so in two
scenarios. In the first scenario, the plaintiffs asserted claims of
tions for Defamation, Emotional Distress and Invasion of Privacy, 28 Duquesne L Rev
545, 546 (1990).
6 See notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Kathy O'Brien, Drug Testing Can Save Companies Money in the
Long Run, Bus Dateline 1 (Jan 1, 1996).
' See notes 45-48 and accompanying text and notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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product liability, breach of contract, defamation, or intentional
tort. Courts have rejected these claims on the ground that the
service provided by the laboratory is not a "product," and that the
laboratory's misconduct was not intentional. In the second and
more troubling scenario, courts presented with a negligence
claim have held that, because the harm involved was purely eco-
nomic or emotional, the plaintiff must prove intentional miscon-
duct on the part of the laboratory in order to recover. In these
cases, plaintiffs who made the same type of simple negligence
claims that were successful in other courts did not recover.
This Comment argues that courts denying liability get it
wrong. While their conclusions find some support in traditional
tort and contract principles, those principles are based on con-
cerns about unlimited liability that do not apply in the context of
false positive test results. Accountants' liability presents a
stronger analogy and demonstrates that physical harm need not
always be present for courts to impose liability for unintentional
misconduct. Part I of this Comment explains why employees
should have a remedy against testing laboratories. The argument
is based in part on the optimal incentives such a duty would cre-
ate for laboratories, and in part on the sad fact that, without
some means to recover against the laboratory, a wronged worker
may have no remedy for the injuries caused by a false positive
test result. Part II describes the conflict in existing case law re-
garding whether such a duty of care exists. Part III explores the
courts' treatment of accountants' liability for insight into how
courts have dealt with negligent infliction of emotional distress
and economic harm. Finally, the Comment concludes that the
common law presumption against recovery for purely economic
loss should not apply in this context, and that fairness and effi-
ciency require imposing a duty of care to workers on drug testing
laboratories.9
I. WHY LIABILITY FOR TESTING LABORATORIES IS APPROPRIATE
This Part explains why workers should have a remedy
against drug testing laboratories that fail to exercise reasonable
care. First, it provides an overview of the drug testing process.
Next, it shows how the existence of a duty would lead to optimal
incentives for the laboratories. Finally, it explains why many
' Of course, academics continue to debate the goals of tort law, including when com-
pensation is required and the relative importance of compensation and efficiency. See
Richard A. Epstein, Cases and Materials on Torts xxxi (Little, Brown 5th ed 1990). In this
case, the goals of compensation and efficiency do not conflict.
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workers will have no remedy if they cannot successfully sue the
laboratories that negligently perform drug tests.
A. An Overview of the Drug Testing Process
Drug testing usually involves urinalysis, a procedure in
which a worker's urine sample is analyzed for the presence of
drugs.' The substances tested for may vary, but the National In-
stitute on Drug Abuse, which regulates drug testing of federal
workers and provides a benchmark for the testing of private
workers, focuses on five drug classes: marijuana, cocaine, opiates
(morphine and codeine), phencyclidine (PCP), and amphetamines
(amphetamine and methamphetamine)." In addition, some pri-
vate employers and state regulators require testing for barbitu-
rates, benzodiazepines (diazepam or Valium, and oxazepam or
Serax), LSD, methaqualone (quaaludes), and propoxyphene
(Darvon). 2
Of the many testing procedures currently available, only one
method, gas chromatography/mass spectrometry ("gas chroma-
tography"), can positively identify the existence of a particular
illegal substance in the urine. 3 That procedure requires expert
administration in controlled clinical conditions and is considera-
bly more expensive than the cheapest testing method.'4
Most worker testing programs use the cheaper immunoassay
methods for an initial screening." These methods do not test for
the presence of particular drugs in the urine, but for their me-
tabolites, the chemicals produced when a drug enters the diges-
tive system. These tests are inherently overinclusive because
they detect metabolites with properties similar to the metabolites
of the drugs for which they are testing.6 For example, immuno-
" Mark D. Uhrich, Are You Positive the Test Is Positive?, HRMagazine 44, 45.46 (Apr
1992).
" Id at 46.
2 Id.
" Gary Lee, The Highly Refined Science of Testing For Possible Drug Use: Results Are
Rarely Erroneous, Specialists Say, Wash Post A10 (June 27, 1995).
" Gas chromatography technicians must have a master's degree or a doctorate. Milt
Freudenheim, Booming Business: Drug Use Tests, NY Times Dl, D2 (Jan 3, 1990). Cheap
testing methods such as on-site immunoassay tests can cost as little as $7. In contrast,
confirmatory gas chromatography tests cost from $100-$150. Edward A. Ward, Employee
Drug Testing: Aalberts and Walker Revisited, J Sm Bus Mgmt 77 (Jan 1991).
Uhrich, HRMagazine at 46 (cited in note 10).
"An immunoassay test is "not highly specific-it may mistake one drug for another."
Lee, Wash Post at A10 (cited in note 13). "The screening test, called the EMIT or enzyme
multiplied immunoassay test, has been shown to give false positives because of 'cross re-
activity'" to substances such as Sudafed. Jeanne Jackson, Drug screening placed on trial
in Belmar case, Asbury Park Press AA1, AA3 (July 9, 1995).
False Positives
assay tests may mistake an over-the-counter cough medicine con-
taining pseudoephedrine for illegal amphetamines." Manufac-
turers of the drug tests claim that these tests are accurate in 95
to 97 percent of all cases, but some studies show that in practice
the tests yield incorrect results in 25 to 60 percent of the cases. 8
As in the case of gas chromatography, the immunoassay methods
require expertise in administering the test, and the differential
between the manufacturer's predicted error rate and the rate
that occurs in practice probably results from improper testing
procedures. 9
Given the wide range of testing methods available and the
degree of skill required to administer these tests, testing labora-
tories can do much to control, and therefore lower, the number of
false positives. By carefully selecting initial testing methods, by
deciding whether to retest positive results, and by investing in
worker training and supervision, testing labs can choose among
different degrees of accuracy. Assuming that, as in the typical
case, the laboratory uses a less accurate method for initial
screenings, laboratories can also choose whether to use a more
accurate method to retest negative results, positive results, or
both. Even if laboratories retest positive results, subtle errors in
favor of false positives may remain.
Furthermore, the testing laboratory's choices about retesting
methods can greatly influence the likelihood that false positives
will be eliminated. If the laboratory retests using the same im-
munoassay method it uses for the initial screening, a substantial
number of false positives will remain, partly because of the im-
munoassay's inaccuracy, and partly because a subject may con-
tinue to use substances with metabolites similar to those of an
illegal drug."° In contrast, retesting positive results with the
" Lee, Wash Post at A1O (cited in note 13).
Jennifer Harris, Testing the Drug-Abuse Waters, Advantage 26 (Apr 1, 1988). See
also Ward, J Sm Bus Mgmt at 77 (cited in note 14), citing R.J. Aalberts and J.L. Walker,
Worker Drug Testing: What the Small Firm Owner Needs to Know, J Sm Bus Mgmt 53
(Oct 1988) (Aalberts and Walker found false positive rates of 5 to 20 percent, but other
studies show overall error rates of 25 to 97 percent.).
""While forensic scientists say the tests are very precise if done correctly, they admit
that human error can lead to inaccurate results." Jackson, Asbury Park Press at AA1,
AA3 (cited in note 16). "Far and away the primary cause of false results is human error.
Samples that are handled carelessly, information entered incorrectly, or techniques not
followed precisely can all contribute to error." Uhrich, HRMagazine at 47 (cited in note
10).
2 These substances may include poppy seeds, antihistamines, ibuprofen, cold medi-
cines, certain arthritis medicines, foreign-made vitamin formulations, topical application
of cocaine during surgery, and "passive inhalation" of crack cocaine or marijuana smoke.
See James L. Abelson, Letter to the Editor, Urine Drug Testing-Watch What You Eat!,
266 JAMA 3130 (1991) (poppy seeds); Condor, Chi Trib at C2 (cited in note 1) (ibuprofen,
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more expensive and accurate gas chromatography test, properly
administered, would eliminate virtually all the false positives."
Of course, the proper administration of drug tests requires not
only scientific expertise, but also tight security in order to avoid
tampering by laboratory workers or outsiders, and the mainte-
nance of detailed records to prove that the specimen has not left
the laboratory's "chain of custody."22
In these ways, laboratories can control the number of false
positives produced during drug testing. Creating the incentives
to exercise that control can have a significant impact on the
number of false positive results. But, in the absence of pressure
from the employers who contract with laboratories to test work-
ers, or from the workers whom they test, laboratories need not
consider the costs of false positives when deciding exactly what
procedures to use and how much money to spend on precautions.
B. Optimal Care Requires that Laboratories Consider Workers'
Preferences as well as Employers'
The level of care that a testing laboratory exercises in pur-
chasing and maintaining equipment, training laboratory work-
ers, and conducting tests influences the number of false positive
test results that are likely to occur. The "optimal" number of
false positives is the number at which the group of people poten-
tially affected by false positives would not want the laboratory to
invest its resources differently, assuming the laboratory could
pass its costs on to those affected by its level of care. At the opti-
mal level of care, the group of affected persons, which includes
both employers and workers, would not want to pay the addi-
poppy seeds, prescription cough medicine, antihistamines); Marie Pulinio, et al, Letter to
the Editor, False-positive Benzodiazepine Urine Test Due to Oaxprozin, 273 JAMA 1905
(1995) (arthritis medicines); M. Joseph Fedoruk and Loretta Lee, Positive Preemployment
Urine Drug Screen Caused by Foreign-Manufactured Vitamin Formulation, 155 W J Med
663 (1991) (foreign-made vitamin formulations); Oscar A. Cruz, et al, Urine Drug Screen-
ing for Cocaine After Lacrimal Surgery, 111 Am J Opthamology 703 (1991) (topical appli-
cation of cocaine); Teri Randall, Infants, Children Test Positive for Cocaine After Exposure
to Second-Hand Crack Smoke, 267 JAMA 1044 (1992) (passive inhalation).
2 An immunoassay test, coupled with a confirmatory gas chromatography test, yields
an accuracy rate of over 99 percent. Ward, J Sm Bus Mgmt at 77 (cited in note 14).
' The chain of custody is a set of procedures used to ensure that the urine sample is
actually produced by the worker at the time of the test, and that neither the worker nor
any other person has any opportunity to adulterate the urine sample. Each individual
who comes in contact with the urine sample must sign and date a form, document, or la-
bel that follows the sample as it is taken from the testing site to the laboratory, tested,
and stored. Rob Brookler, Industry Standards in Workplace Drug Testing: EQP and Drug
Testing, Personnel J 128, 130 (1992); H. Westley Clark, The Role of Physicians as Medical
Review Officers in Workplace Drug Testing Programs: In Pursuit of the Last Nanogram,
152 W J Med 514 (1990).
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tional cost required to reduce the number of false positives
slightly. At the same time, this group would not choose a higher
level of false positives if the laboratory passed on its incremental
savings from the less costly methods.
When the entire group's preferences are not considered, the
laboratory's level of care will probably deviate from the optimum.
Indeed, if only employers' preferences are considered, the num-
ber of false positives likely will increase. Since employers gener-
ally pay for drug tests, testing laboratories have no reason to
consider the preferences of the individual workers they test. Be-
cause employers' major concerns are with costs and efficiency,
they are likely to request the cheapest possible methods or seek
out the cheapest provider of testing services.23
Indeed, it is likely that most employers prefer a testing
method that yields more false positives than false negatives. This
is because the potential costs of keeping a drug abuser in the
workplace due to a false negative, with the attendant reputa-
tional, motivational, and economic consequences, probably ex-
ceeds an employer's cost of finding a replacement for a worker
mistakenly terminated on the basis of a false positive. Employers
may view the possibility of mistakenly dismissing these workers
to be a trivial loss when compared with the risk of continuing to
employ drug users, who pose threats of theft, reduced productiv-
ity, accidents, absenteeism, and tardiness.24 While this assump-
tion might be false in a labor market where workers require sub-
stantial education and training, and are therefore difficult to re-
place, for-cause and random drug testing occurs most often with
' Of course, in some cases, employers might find more expensive methods in their
self-interest because the cost of losing an innocent worker exceeds the marginal cost of
the more expensive method, but this is unlikely, assuming that most employers probably
test low-level workers instead of professionals in whom the company must invest sub-
stantial training.
2' Wendy D. Farina, The Controversy Continues: Drug Testing, Sec Mgmt 65 (Feb
1990). Assuming that a worker could prove that her test result was false, she might be
able to get her job back. However, in most cases, proving the worker's innocence would
take time, during which the worker's position probably would be filled. In addition, some
employers might view the worker as "damaged goods" and choose to believe the first
(positive) result rather than the second; a worker would have no redress for this action.
In addition, proving a false positive requires that the laboratory take the important
precautionary measure of "splitting" the worker's sample, testing one and retaining the
other so that a second test can be performed to verify the accuracy of the first. Without
such a split, a worker cannot prove that the drugs did not simply leave her system be-
tween the first test and the second. As a practical matter, courts will probably have to
adopt a "res ipsa loquitur" rule with regard to split samples since, otherwise, laboratories
could avoid liability by not using them. Split samples are a routine aspect of the two-step
immunoassay and gas chromatography testing regimen, so most laboratories should al-
ready require them.
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low-skilled workers who face greater competition from other
workers and receive less training.
Of course, laboratories do not explicitly give employers the
option of choosing a testing method that is less costly than the
optimal method and that yields more false positivesY But labo-
ratories that are willing to skip expensive double-checking proce-
dures can undercut those that are not, thereby giving employers
cheaper testing with the only disadvantage being a higher false
positive rate-arguably a result that employers prefer.
Workers, in contrast, would prefer testing methods that
minimize false positives. When a false positive occurs, the worker
loses the value of her current position and may also face substan-
tially reduced employment prospects for the future. In addition,
she may feel considerable distress and public embarrassment at
being labeled a drug user. The employer, in contrast, only incurs
a one-time expense of firing and replacing the worker.27 Thus, be-
cause the potential harm to workers from false positives dra-
matically outweighs that of their employers, the failure to take
workers' preferences into account leads to imperfect incentives
for drug testing laboratories.28
' Laboratories may also choose the "cutoff level" above which the presence of a sub-
stance will be reported as a positive result. "Decisions on choosing cutoffs depend on how
many false negatives, false positives, and unconfirmed test results are economically and
scientifically acceptable.... [Value judgments may differ." DeCew, 24 Hastings Ctr Rept
at 19 (cited in note 3).
For example, employers can easily cut corners by dealing with laboratories that are
not certified by NIDA. NIDA-certified laboratories must pass stringent tests, so certifica-
tion provides strong evidence that the laboratory will exercise a high degree of care in or-
der to avoid false positive results. Because laboratories must pay seventeen thousand
dollars merely to apply for certification, however, laboratories that forgo the certification
can offer services at a lower price--but may also offer less accurate results. David A. Am-
bruster, A guide to NIDA certification for workplace drug testing, Med Lab Observer 31
(Feb 1992). On average, drug testing for workers subject to federal rules (which include
use of a NIDA-certified laboratory) costs ten dollars more per worker than tests for those
not so subject. Freudenheim, NY Times at D1 (cited in note 14). A recent AMA study
showed that 20 percent of the firms that test for drugs do not use NIDA-certified labora-
tories for confirming positive results. Condor, Chi Trib at C2 (cited in note 1). Since only
20 to 30 percent of applicants pass NIDA's certification process, however, chances are
that a substantial number of non-AMA companies use uncertified laboratories. Brookler,
Personnel J at 128 (cited in note 1). According to the Institute for a Drug-Free Workplace,
not using a NIDA-approved lab can produce false-positive results at a rate of 2 to 8 per-
cent. Condor, Chi Trib at C2 (cited in note 1).
" This is especially true where the employer tests on a for-cause basis, because the
benefit to an employer of retaining an employee whose performance has been below par
or who has been involved in a workplace accident, but who does not use drugs, is very
low. In fact, the employer may be delighted to have a litigation-proof, easily explained
justification to fire the worker.
In a perfect market where workers and employers have full information, laborato-




If employers had the right incentives, they could bargain
with laboratories for the level of protection that workers want. In
theory, workers would be willing to pay employers to choose reli-
able laboratories. This payment would be reflected in the work-
ers' willingness to accept a lower compensation package than
they would otherwise receive. Workers would weigh the marginal
loss of job security from less reliable methods with the increase
in compensation they could receive by accepting such methods.
Several problems limit the effectiveness of this solution.
First, few workers will have enough information about the rela-
tive reliability of drug testing laboratories, and their individual
chances of receiving a false positive result, to make this calcula-
tion. Second, asking the potential employer about its drug testing
program might make a bad impression, since it suggests that the
worker may have used drugs. Finally, these negotiations would
be based on the reputation of the laboratories an employer might
use; this would be likely to change over time and make it difficult
to create a useful contractual term between employers and work-
ers.
Unfortunately, in the drug testing context, most employers
do not have an adequate incentive to take workers' preferences
into account. Most employers cannot be held liable for failing to
protect workers against false positives. The false positive may
cause an unreasonable termination of the worker, but the doc-
trine of employment-at-will protects employers from suits for un-
reasonable termination absent certain narrow exceptions that
will not apply in this context.29
Even if employers were held liable, and therefore had to take
workers' preferences into account, this would not be as effective
as holding laboratories liable. After all, employers have only in-
direct control over the precautions taken." Employers can hire
' See Part IIB. In other contexts, employers are forced to consider workers' prefer-
ences because they face legal liability for harms to workers. Hostile environment dis-
crimination provides an example of how this occurs: since it is costly to monitor workers'
behavior, employers may prefer to risk losing a few workers rather than expend the re-
sources necessary to make the workplace tolerable to everyone. In contrast, workers
probably would prefer that the employer make the effort, even if it passed on its costs to
workers in the form of lower compensation. Because it is difficult to discover whether a
workplace is hostile without actually working in it, workers might have trouble bargain-
ing for the result they prefer. By holding employers liable for hostile environment dis-
crimination, however, the law forces them to consider costs to workers when deciding
whether and how much to monitor workplace problems.
If employers were liable, they might have indemnification suits against a negligent
laboratory for their errors. However, this would add unnecessary administrative costs
compared to simply holding laboratories liable. Innocent employers would face costly liti-
gation, even if the laboratory eventually indemnified them. While this cost would give
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and fire laboratories on the basis of their reputations for safety,
and would have an incentive to do so if held liable to workers for
termination on the basis of a false positive. But, since laborato-
ries have more direct control over the precautions they take, im-
posing liability on them directly would achieve better results. In-
deed, imposing a duty of reasonable care on drug testing labora-
tories will lead to optimal testing precautions by correcting the
likely bias in favor of false positives that results from considering
only employers' preferences."
C. Recovery Against the Employer is Difficult for the Worker
Workers often look to their employers for redress when they
are terminated on the basis of an allegedly false positive result.
Although some workers recover based on exceptions to employ-
ment-at-will, many find they are unable to recover their losses.2
Plaintiffs sometimes recover for defamation, but this usually re-
quires that an employer communicate the results of a positive
test knowing that a subsequent test came up negative.3 3 Simi-
larly, some plaintiffs have recovered for invasion of privacy, but
this has succeeded only when the defendant required that the
employers an extra incentive to choose trustworthy laboratories, the additional litigation
costs of liability might outweigh any benefit.
"1 This Comment assumes that there is an optimal point at which the excess of bene-
fits over costs for the testing procedures used, taking into account the preferences of all
parties immediately involved, is greatest. In a perfectly functioning marketplace, this re-
salt could be achieved contractually. In the employment context, however, information
failure may prevent the optimal result from occurring contractually.
See, for example, Stein v Davidson Hotel Co, 1996 Tenn App LEXIS 280 (Term Ct
App) (holding that worker who was terminated after a false positive drug test failed to
state a claim against defendant employer). See also Jennings v Minco Technology Labs,
Inc, 765 SW2d 497 (Tex App 1989); Satterfield v Lockheed Missiles and Space Co, 617 F
Supp 1359 (D SC 1985), cited in Dangelo, Comment, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 548 (cited in
note 5). The doctrine of "self-publication" defamation liability, recently recognized by the
Minnesota Supreme Court, could be applied in this situation. See Dangelo, Comment, 28
Duquesne L Rev at 550-51 (cited in note 5). Traditional defamation liability does not ap-
ply, because employers' statements about worker drug use within the company are gen-
erally protected by a qualified privilege, and employers generally do not convey the in-
formation to third parties. In "self-publication" defamation, however, a plaintiff can re-
cover where the plaintiff is "in some way compelled to communicate a defendant's de-
famatory statement to a third person and it is foreseeable to the defendant that the plain-
tiff would be so compelled." Id at 552. This could apply to situations in which a worker is
fired on the basis of a false positive test result, and must then repeat the results of the
test in interviews with prospective employers who inquire about the reason for termina-
tion. Id, citing Lewis v Equitable Life Assurance Society, 389 NW2d 876 (Mirn 1986).
See, for example, Houston Belt and Terminal Railway Co v Wherry, 548 SW2d 743
(Tex Civ App 1977) (allowing plaintiff to recover from employer who intentionally pub-
lished results of plaintiff's positive drug test knowing that subsequent test was negative),
cited in Dangelo, Comment, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 549 (cited in note 5).
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plaintiff be observed while producing the urine sample.' These
causes of action deal with intentional abuse of a worker's privacy,
but do not protect the typical worker whose employer has termi-
nated her in good faith on the basis of one or two drug tests.
Some workers may recover against their employers for
wrongful termination. However, two factors limit the usefulness
of wrongful termination actions for victims of false positive test
results. First, a wrongful termination action requires that the
employer act "wrongfully," which generally means in violation of
public policy.35 Thus, since drug testing programs serve impor-
tant public policy goals," if an employer relies on the results of
the drug test in good faith, it will not be held liable for the termi-
nation.37
Second, two-thirds of workers today are employees-at-will,38
which means their employers can terminate them at any time
and for any reason, for just cause or no cause.39 Although the doc-
trine of employment-at-will is circumscribed by certain public
policy exceptions, simple unfairness is not one of them." An im-
plied "just cause" exception to employment-at-will may arise
when an employer, through its personnel manual or recruitment
promises, has suggested that it will not terminate a worker arbi-
trarily.4' While an implied promise not to terminate on the basis
Kelley v Schlumberger Technology Corp, 849 F2d 41, 43 (1st Cir 1988), cited in
Dangelo, Comment, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 553 (cited in note 5).
' Dangelo, Comment, 28 Duquesne L Rev at 548 (cited in note 5); Stein, 1996 Ten
App LEXIS 280 at *10-21.
In holding that an employer's policy of terminating workers based on positive test
results did not violate public policy even where the plaintiff alleged that the testing labo-
ratory was negligent, the Stein court pointed out that the policy violated no statute, con-
stitutional provision, or other clear public policy, and that "[t]o the contrary, creating a
drug free work environment in the public and private sector is completely consistent with
the State of Tennessee's public policy." 1996 Tenn App LEXIS 280 at *21.
, See Adolph M. Koven and Susan L. Smith, Just Cause: The Seven Tests 105 (BNA
2d ed 1992) (NA] positive test result is cause for discharge or other discipline....").
' Frances H. Miller, Biological Monitoring: The Employer's Dilemma, 9 Am J L Med
387,423(1984).
Decew, 24 Hastings Ctr Rpt at 33 (cited in note 3); James N. Dertouzos, The End of
Employment-at-Will: Legal and Economic Costs 1 (RAND 1988).
' Those exceptions generally consist of situations in which the worker tries to exer-
cise a right or duty of citizenship, such as refusing to violate a law or reporting her em-
ployer's violation, or situations where the employer's conduct gives rise to an implied just
cause limitation on the right to terminate. Additionally, most states recognize a public
policy exception for worker "whistleblowers" who report an employer's violation of the law
or question a perceived violation without reporting it. The law recognizes this duty not
simply because the employer has acted unfairly, but because the law must recognize the
worker's competing obligations of loyaltY to her employer and duty as a citizen to report a
crime. See Daniel P. Westman, Whistleblowing: The Law of Retaliatory Discharge 19, 24-
28 (BNA 1991).
" Ralph H. Baxter, Jr. and Gary R. Siniscalco, Manager's Guide to Lawful Termina-
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of a false positive test result may provide a basis for recovery,
careful employers will avoid making such promises.
Finally, workers in a few states are protected by a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in employment relationships. How-
ever, this duty has generally been applied where an employer's
conduct was malicious or otherwise clearly wrongful 2 In most
situations, an employer will rely on the results of a drug test in
good faith because the employer lacks expertise in determining
the appropriate level of care for a testing laboratory. While new
public policy exceptions to employment-at-will may develop as
the modern trend against the at-will rule continues, 43 for now
most workers have difficulty recovering from their employers on
the basis of false positive test results. 4
This Comment argues that holding drug testing laboratories
liable for failure to take reasonable precautions against false
positives achieves a balance between competing policy concerns
by ensuring that the full consequences of false positives will be
borne by the party with the greatest control over the accuracy of
test results. Because workers cannot recover from their employ-
ers, imposing liability on drug testing laboratories would also
prevent lack of compensation for workers harmed by false posi-
tives.
II. CASES REGARDING LIABILITY OF LABORATORIES FOR
FALSE POSITIVES
A number of workers have sued laboratories for false posi-
tive test results, and have received a mixed reception from the
courts. Some courts have analyzed the issue as a question of
simple negligence, with the existence of a duty to be determined
by a balancing test. These courts have frequently held testing
laboratories liable, but for unclear reasons. Other courts have al-
together ignored the possibility of a remedy for simple negli-
gence, denying plaintiffs' claims for strict product liability and
breach of contract, and converting their claims for simple negli-
gence into torts requiring intentional conduct such as interfer-
ence with contractual advantage or infliction of emotional dis-
tress. As the following discussion demonstrates, the courts hold-
tions 19-23 (Exec Enter 1983); Pine River State Bank v Mettille, 333 NW2d 622 (Minn
1983).
42 Baxter and Siniscalco, Manager's Guide at 31-35 (cited in note 41).
See generally Dertouzos, The End of Employment-at-Will (cited in note 39).
,Anne M. Rector, Comment, Use and Abuse of Urinalysis Testing in the Workplace: A




ing testing laboratories liable did so without fully considering
possible objections to imposing liability, while the courts denying
liability recognized those objections but did not adequately con-
sider possible replies.
A. Cases Imposing Liability
Courts in Louisiana and Illinois have held that testing labo-
ratories owe a general duty of care to the subjects of their tests.45
Most states determine the existence of a duty of care by applying
a multi-factor balancing test. Although the factors vary slightly
from state to state, most courts weigh the foreseeability of the
injury, the likelihood of the injury, the difficulty of preventing it,
and the consequences of placing the burden on the defendant."
Properly applied, this balancing test leads to liability for
negligent drug testing laboratories. The injury caused by a false
positive result is clearly foreseeable. After all, drug testing labo-
ratories are surely aware that employers may base decisions
whether to hire or fire workers on the result of a positive test.
This injury is also likely, given the potential for the mishandling
of specimens, the failure to retest positive results using the more
accurate gas chromatography method, and the failure to explore
the possibility of alternative causes for a positive result.47 The
difficulty of avoiding such an injury is not great, and any costs of
45 See Elliott v Laboratory Specialists, Inc, 588 S2d 175 (La App 1991); Lewis v Alu-
minum Co of America, 588 S2d 167 (La App 1991); Nehrenz v Dunn, 598 S2d 915 (La App
1992); Stinson v Physicians Immediate Care, Ltd, 269 M11 App 3d 659, 646 NE2d 930
(1995).
See, for example, Gouge v Central Illinois Public Service Co, 144 Ill 2d 535, 582
NE2d 108, 112 (1991), cited in Stinson, 646 NE2d at 933; Ingle v Allen, 71 NC App 20,
321 SE2d 588, 594 (1984); Griggs v BIC Corp, 981 F2d 1429, 1435-36 (3d Cir 1992); Palka
v Servicemaster Management Services Corp, 83 NY2d 579, 611 NYS2d 817, 821 (1994);
White v Southern California Edison Co, 25 Cal App 4th 442, 30 Cal Rptr 431, 435 (1994);
Fetty v Miller, 905 SW2d 296, 301 (Tex App 1995); Coleman v Eddy Potash, Inc, 120 NM
645, 905 P2d 185, 190 (1995); Cram v Howell, 662 NE2d 678, 681 (Ind App 1996); Hill v
Charlie Club, Inc, 279 IMl App 3d 754, 665 NE2d 321, 325 (1996); King v King, 922 F Supp
700, 705 (D NH 1996); Carvalho v Toll Brothers and Developers, 143 NJ 565, 675 A2d
209, 212 (1996); Golden Spread Council, Inc v Akins, 926 SW2d 287, 289-90 (Tex 1996);
Trask v Butler, 123 Wash 1026, 872 P2d 1080, 1083 (1994).
" Both simple negligence and duty to warn claims could be completely preempted by
the use of a Medical Review Officer (MRO). An MRO is an independent expert who dis-
cusses a positive result with the subject in order to determine whether the result has
some explanation other than drug use. This review takes place before the results are
transmitted to the employer, thereby protecting the worker's privacy and reputation.
Clark, 152 W J Med at 515-16 (cited in note 22). If courts consistently held laboratories
liable for failure to warn, laboratories might begin using MROs as standard practice.
Currently, this is not standard. Of the firms surveyed by the American Management As-
sociation in 1994, fewer than half the firms testing for drugs used an MRO to explore pos-
sible causes of positive results.
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doing so can be passed on to the workers who benefit from the
care: the laboratory can raise its prices, and employers can offer
workers reduced compensation in exchange for the more expen-
sive tests. Finally, the consequence of placing the burden on the
testing laboratories is to align the incentives to encourage the
avoidance of an injury where the laboratory has the ability to do
SO.
Four courts applying this balancing test have found liability,
although only one court examined each factor of the balancing
test.
48
In the first of these cases, Elliott v Laboratory Specialists,
Inc, the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld a jury verdict of
twenty-five thousand dollars against Laboratory Specialists, Inc.
("LSI"), in favor of a worker, David Elliott, who had received a
false positive test result.49 The court applied a balancing test to
determine whether LSI owed Elliott a duty of care, stating that
"[t]o suggest that LSI does not owe Elliott a duty to analyze his
body fluid in a scientifically reasonable manner is an abuse of
fundamental fairness and justice."0
Lewis v Aluminum Co of America, decided at about the same
time as Elliott, analyzed the issue more thoroughly than the El-
liott court, addressing all the factors of the balancing test before
assigning liability.5' The court began by finding applicable a
Louisiana statute that imposes a duty on a tortfeasor to repair
damage caused through his negligence, imprudence, or want of
skill.52 Having thus established that negligence might be appro-
priate, the court then pointed out that damages were foreseeable
and not remote, and that imposing liability would not "create an
undue burden upon [the defendant's] freedom of action."53 By
making these points, the court came close to addressing privity
concerns. Like courts considering liability for negligent perform-
ance of accounting services, the court emphasized that the labo-
ratory knew of the plaintiff, and was aware that its negligence
could lead to loss of employment opportunities and reputational
damage. The court then concluded that imposing a duty of rea-
" Surprisingly, none of the opinions finding liability explicitly addressed possible ar-
guments against liability. This makes it more difficult to determine why privity, which
proved determinative in other cases, did not bar recovery. However, each of the courts
considers the foreseeability of the harm and the certain nature of the liability, two con-
cerns motivating the privity requirement.
' 588 S2d 175 (La App 1991).
Id at 176.
SI Lewis, 588 S2d 167, 170 (La App 1991).
s' Id, citing La Civ Code Ann §§ 2315-16 (West 1979).
Lewis, 588 S2d at 170.
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sonable care would "foster a greater sense of responsibility
within [the laboratory] to perform its drug testing services in a
skillful and competent manner." "4
In a subsequent Louisiana case, Nehrenz v Dunn, the court
found liability based on "simple negligence," applying the same
Louisiana statute used in Lewis.5 The court did not, however,
engage in an in-depth analysis of the policies for and against li-
ability. Instead, the court relied upon Louisiana's negligence
statute, cited Lewis for the proposition .that negligence has been
imposed in Louisiana, and concluded that "[t]his duty encom-
passes the injuries which Nehrenz allegedly sustained." 6
In the most recent case, Stinson v Physicians Immediate
Care, Ltd, the Appellate Court of Illinois used a balancing test to
determine whether the laboratory stood in such a relationship to
the plaintiff that it had a duty to act reasonably for his protec-
tion. The court considered and rejected the argument that no
duty could exist without contractual privity. 7 The court drew an
analogy between the duty an attorney owes to a third-party bene-
ficiary of a contract and the duty a testing laboratory owes to the
subject of a drug test.5" The court then concluded that "there is a
close relationship between a plaintiff and a defendant which had
a contract with the plaintiffs employer if it is reasonably fore-
seeable that the plaintiff will be harmed if the defendant negli-
gently reports test results to the employer."59 The court empha-
sized that, although the plaintiff could not recover on the basis of
a contractual duty, "It]here need not be a contract between the
plaintiff and the defendant for the defendant to owe a tort
duty."60
The court's balancing test included "the foreseeability of the
injury, the likelihood of the injury, the magnitude of the burden
of guarding against it and the consequences of placing that bur-
den on the defendant," and concluded that a duty was appropri-
ate.61 In reaching this conclusion, the court pointed out that the
plaintiffs injury was not only foreseeable, but "a virtual cer-
"4 Id.
Nehrenz, 593 S2d 915, 918 (La App 1992).
Id. The court also noted that it had "found a cause of action based on negligence in
Lewis... ."Id at 917.
269 Ill App 3d 659, 646 NE2d 930, 933-34 (1995).
Id at 933. The court did not explicitly consider whether the tested worker was the
intended beneficiary of the contract between the employer and the laboratory, and cases
considering the question have decided that the test subject is not the primary beneficiary.
See, for example, Devine v Roche Biomedical Laboratories, 659 A2d 868, 870 (Me 1995).
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tainty" in the event of a false positive test result, and that the
likelihood was great.12 The court found the burden on the defen-
dant of a duty to be negligible because the laboratory "is in the
best position to guard against the injury, as it is solely responsi-
ble for the performance of the testing and the quality control
process," and "is better able to bear the burden financially than
the individual wrongly maligned by a false positive report."63
Although these courts each take a slightly different approach
to the issue, all of them reach the correct result. Their argu-
ments, while persuasive, could pay more attention to efficiency
and precedent. As will be discussed more fully below, other
courts deny recovery to victims of false positives because the
laboratory is not in privity with the worker and the harm is
purely economic. The response to these courts' concerns can be
found in the analogy to accountants' liability, which will be con-
sidered in Part III.
B. Cases Denying Liability
Some cases deny liability for the same type of simple negli-
gence claims with which the plaintiffs in Stinson, Elliott, Ne-
hrenz, and Lewis succeeded. Others deny liability because the
plaintiff pleaded a cause of action in a novel way. Such claims in-
clude intentional and strict liability torts, contract claims, and
"failure to warn" claims. Intentional torts, such as intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress and intentional interference with
contractual or economic advantage, fail unless plaintiffs can
prove intentional conduct. Strict liability actions such as product
liability, malpractice, and breach of contract all fail because
courts reject their applicability in the drug testing context. Fail-
ure to warn claims fail because courts are unwilling to impose
such an amorphous duty.
At first glance, this might suggest that plaintiffs need simply
plead their cases carefully. In several cases, however, courts have
effectively converted simple negligence actions into claims for in-
tentional torts, stating that the cause of action is nothing more
than a claim of interference with contractual advantage, and
stating that the cause of action is not recognized in the court's
state. Indeed, most states require intentional conduct for inter-
ference with contractual advantage or infliction of emotional dis-
tress. The following discussion of the cases in which plaintiffs'





action failed and will note the absence of clear explanations for
the courts' failure to recognize claims for simple negligence.
1. Product liability.
In DiTomaso v Electronic Data Systems, several security
guards attempted to sue a drug testing laboratory, as a product
manufacturer, for negligently designing a urinalysis test and for
breaching implied and express warranties." The "product" was
not the machinery used to run the test, but the testing procedure
and results, which were allegedly defective because they ren-
dered false positive results and because they revealed the use of
drugs rather than the impairment of faculties by drugs.65 The
court questioned the characterization of the test as a "product,"
but ruled instead on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to
produce any evidence that the test could or did result in a false
positive. The court noted that, in contrast, there had been expert
testimony to the effect that the laboratory had never had a false
positive, and that the series of three increasingly sophisticated
tests it used to identify and verify positive results had never been
documented to produce a false positive in the scientific litera-
ture.66
Since DiTomaso did not explicitly decide whether a test re-
sult could be a "defective product" for which a testing laboratory
could be held strictly liable, it does not provide precedent for
other courts. However, it is unlikely that other courts will accept
this rationale for liability because there is no defective "product"
for which a "manufacturer" could be held liable in the typical
case. If a plaintiff could show that the equipment used to perform
the test was defective, she might recover from the equipment's
manufacturer, although even then she might have to show physi-
cal harm.67 In contrast, the typical drug testing plaintiff wants to
1988 US Dist LEXIS 16806, *1 (E D Mich). If the laboratory were a manufacturer,
it would have a duty under Michigan law to warn foreseeable users of the dangers inher-
ent in its product. Id at *4.
Id at *1.
Id at *5-7. The court also sidestepped the issue of whether the test could be consid-
ered a "good" or "product" for purposes of a warranty claim, holding instead that the Uni-
form Commercial Code only applies between buyers and sellers, not between manufac-
turers and third party consumers. Id at *7.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts contains the following entry on product liability:
§ 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property ....
Comment d of the section includes examples of products, which include "an automobile, a
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recover for negligent provision of a service, not negligent design
or construction of a physical object, so her claim does not fall
within product liability.
Courts are unlikely to hold laboratories liable under this
theory, and the consequences of doing so would be inferior to
holding them liable under a negligence theory. While product li-
ability would have the advantage of compensating workers, even
in cases where the laboratory was not at fault, the imperfect
analogy might lead to disputes over whether a part of the testing
service, say the "chain of command" for testing records, consti-
tuted part of the "product" or an extraneous service. General
negligence liability will avoid this problem. Furthermore, ex-
tending product liability to drug testing services would open the
door to imposing strict liability for all kinds of services; the care-
fully drawn exceptions to negligence would swallow the rule.
Therefore, despite the superficial attractiveness of strict product
liability, courts should limit liability to situations in which the
plaintiff can prove negligence.
2. Defamation.
In Willis v Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc, the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, a testing lab, had defamed him by
communicating false positive test results to his employer.68 The
Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, held that a qualified privilege
attached to a testing laboratory's communication of false positive
results to an employer, and thus a worker must show express or
implied malice to recover.69 The need to recognize a qualified
privilege in this context seems clear; without it, testing laborato-
ries would be strictly liable for false positives.0 In some respects,
strict liability would be superior to negligence liability in the
drug testing context, because proving negligence will be difficult
tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting
machine, a chair, and an insecticide." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).
61 F3d 313 (5th Cir 1995).
Id at 316-17.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides two exceptions to the general rule of
strict liability for the publication of defamatory matter. The first, the absolute privilege,
does not apply. The second, conditional (or qualified) privilege, does. Section 595 provides
that a publication is privileged if it "affects a sufficiently important interest" of the recipi-
ent, and if the publisher is under a legal duty to publish the information or if its publica-
tion is consistent with standards of decent conduct. In deciding whether something con-
stitutes decent conduct, an important consideration is whether the information is pro-
vided in response to a request or is volunteered; responding to a request generally consti-
tutes decent conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1977). According to § 593, a
publisher will not be held liable where the occasion makes the publication privileged, and
where that privilege is not abused.
[64:287
False Positives
and costly, and workers will not be compensated under negli-
gence when the false positive result is not caused by laboratory
negligence. However, this would be an unprecedented step be-
yond current law, which limits strict liability to certain unique
situations, most of which involve physical harm.' Thus, defama-
tion is an inappropriate remedy, because it imposes strict liabil-
ity for behavior that is typically subject to a duty of reasonable
care, and because it prevents a complete analysis of the policy is-
sues for and against holding testing laboratories liable.
3. Infliction of economic harm.
Typically, tort claims involve physical injury, with economic
or emotional harm as a consequence of the physical injury. In
fact, the common law traditionally did not allow damages for
purely economic harm without proof of physical injury. 2 Today,
courts allow damages for purely economic harm in many circum-
stances, 3 but the basic common law rule remains unchanged.
The common law does recognize the tort of intentional interfer-
ence with a contractual right, and one court upheld a lower court
ruling that a testing laboratory had failed to negate a claim of
"willful and intentional interference with the conditional offer of
employment."
However, the recognition of intentional interference with
contractual rights does not help the typical victim of a false posi-
tive who suffers because of the testing laboratory's negligence
and finds herself within the scope of the common law rule
against purely economic damages. In Herbert v Placid Refining
Co, the Louisiana Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs claim
for simple negligence was essentially a claim-for negligent inter-
ference with contractual rights, whereas Louisiana required in-
tentional interference." Thus, by recharacterizing the plaintiffs
claim as one requiring intentional action, the court made liability
impossible.76
7 Volume 3 (Strict Liability) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1977) includes
trespass by livestock (§§ 504-05); harm, other than trespass, done by wild animals (§§
506-18); and abnormally dangerous activities (§§ 519-24A). Strict liability also includes
defamation and product liability.
' Ann O'Brien, Note, Limited Recovery Rule as a Dam: Preventing a Flood of Litiga-
tion for Negligent Infliction of Pure Economic Loss, 31 Ariz L Rev 959, 959-61 (1989), cit-
ing Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co v Flint, 275 US 303 (1927).
' In fact, a minority of states now allow recovery in negligence for foreseeable eco-
nomic losses. O'Brien, Note, 31 Ariz L Rev at 959-61 (cited in note 72). See also Part III.
' SmithKline Beecham Corp v Doe, 903 SW2d 347, 355 (Tex 1995).
564 S2d 371, 374 (La App 1990).
" The court's reasons for doing so were unclear; Part III will argue that the court
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4. Breach of contractual duty of reasonable care.
Some workers have sued testing laboratories for breach of a
contractual duty of reasonable care and argued that the labora-
tory owes the same duty of care to the worker that it does to the
employer. Generally, contracting parties only acquire a duty to
one another; the parties have no duty to third parties who might
be affected by the performance of their contractual obligations."
However, the law provides two important exceptions to this rule:
the foreseeable reliance exception, and the exception for third
party beneficiaries.
Under the reliance exception, a contracting party whose con-
duct induces reasonable reliance by a third party may be liable if
that third party "changed her position" in reliance upon that
conduct. 8 No case has addressed the reliance exception in the
drug testing' context.79 In practice, plaintiffs rely on the third
party beneficiary exception. Under this exception, a contracting
party acquires a duty of reasonable care toward a non-
contracting party who is the intended beneficiary of the con-
tract." However, this exception requires that the contracting
parties intend, at the time they contract, primarily to benefit the
third party. This element is questionable in the employer drug
testing situation. The employer's purpose in arranging for the
implicitly rejected the negligence claim because it seemed inconsistent with traditional
rules against recovery for economic harm without a relationship of privity. Since simple
negligence liability and the traditional duty balancing test are available in the common
law of every state, the court probably rejected that analysis because of the traditional re-
fusal to award purely economic damages to parties not in privity. This traditional princi-
ple has steadily eroded over time and should not be applied in the drug testing context.
See text accompanying notes 108-13.
Contracting parties may be held liable for physical injuries to third parties, but
generally face no liability for negligence resulting in purely economic harm. James M.
Dente, Negligence Liability to All Foreseeable Parties for Pure Economic Harm: The Final
Assault upon the Citadel, 21 Wake Forest L Rev 587, 588 (1986).
See, for example, Corbin on Contracts § 779B (1951 & Supp 1996); Dente, 21 Wake
Forest L Rev at 591 (cited in note 77), citing cases.
Hypothetically, though, a worker could claim that she relied on the belief that the
testing laboratory would use reasonable care when she decided to take a drug test. How-
ever, she would have difficulty showing that her belief caused her to change her position,
since her only alternative would have been to quit her job. In some cases, however, this
might be a plausible argument, particularly where the demand for a worker's services is
high and she foregoes other opportunities by applying to this employer. In such a case, a
false positive causes not only the loss of the current job, but a substantial reduction in fu-
ture job prospects. If a worker feared the risk of permanent unemployment enough to
cause her to give up her current job rather than to take a drug test without adequate
safeguards, she might succeed in arguing that she 'changed her position" in reliance on
her belief that reasonable care would be taken, simply by not quitting. The number of
situations in which this argument could apply seems small, however, and plaintiffs
should not have to fit within this narrow class in order to recover.
See generally Corbin on Contracts §§ 772, 776-79 (cited in note 78).
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test is to increase worker productivity and to avoid lawsuits from
clients or other workers who could be hurt as a result of on-the-
job drug use. Although workers whose tests come out negative
certainly receive a reputational benefit from the test results, and
although a worker who tests positive can be rehabilitated, these
benefits to the worker are at best a bonus to the employer, and
do not make the contract between the employer and the testing
laboratory one that confers its primary benefit upon the worker.
Thus, it is not surprising that in Devine v Roche Biomedical
Laboratories, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held that a
worker was not a third party beneficiary of a contract between
the employer and the testing laboratory.8'
Although a contractual remedy for workers would achieve
the same goals as negligence liability, courts are much less likely
to grant such a remedy. The exceptions to the privity require-
ment in contract are well established and thoroughly developed
by the courts. Like product liability and defamation, the excep-
tions to contractual privity have been carefully designed for ap-
plication to a limited number of situations. In contrast, the duty
test for negligence liability remains flexible, allowing courts to
consider policy objectives and adapt to new situations. For these
reasons, courts should prefer a tort duty to a contractual duty for
drug testing laboratories.
5. Duty to warn.
As explained above, many of the tests used to detect drug
use may mistake legal substances, such as foods or non-
prescription medicines, for illegal drugs. 2 Based on this fact, and
the possibility that employers might overestimate the accuracy of
drug tests, one plaintiff argued that the testing laboratory had a
duty to warn her, or her employer, that ingestion of poppy seeds
could cause a false positive test result. In SmithKline Beecham
Corp v Doe, the Supreme Court of Texas rejected her argument,
finding that no duty to warn existed with respect to either the
plaintiff or her employer." An earlier case, Caputo v Compuchem
Laboratories, Inc, also refused, on the facts, to hold a testing
laboratory liable under a duty-to-warn theory where it produced
a "weak" positive result and, instead of retesting the specimen
with more sophisticated equipment, reported the result to the
" 659 A2d 868, 870 (Me 1995). The court stated in a footnote that the plaintiff would
have a tort claim, but that his failure to produce an issue of material fact "left Devine's
third party beneficiary claim as his last hope against the laboratories." Id at 871 n 2.
See note 20.
903 SW2d 347, 354 (Tex 1995).
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employer." Both of these cases, however, have unusual facts that
suggest that they might not preclude a court from finding a duty
to warn in future cases.8"
The SmithKline court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
the lab had a duty to warn based on its awareness of the danger
of false positives. The plaintiff had cited a prior case, Buchanan v
Rose," in which a bridge broke down as a truck driver drove over
it, due not to any negligence on the driver's part, but to the
bridge's deteriorated condition. A witness driving behind the
truck saw the bridge break under the weight of the truck's rear
wheels. The witness then managed to cross the bridge and over-
take the truck driver. The witness notified the driver of the dan-
gerous situation he had created by his passage and suggested he
post a warning; the truck driver refused to do so." The Supreme
Court of Texas held that the truck driver had no duty to post a
warning because he did not negligently create the dangerous
situation.88 The SmithKline plaintiff argued that the testing labo-
ratory should be liable because, unlike the truck driver, it had
"created a dangerous situation-namely, the possibility that she
would test positive when she had not used any drugs."89
In applying the precedent to SmithKline, the court observed
that, although the truck's passage made the bridge's defects ap-
1994 US Dist LEXIS 2191, *12 (E D Pa), affd without opinion, 37 F3d 1485 (3d Cir
1994), cert denied, 115 S Ct 733 (1995).
In SmithKline Beecham, the plaintiff initially tried to explain away the positive re-
sult by stating that she had taken her roommate's Vicodin, a fact she had not disclosed
before the test. Prior to the test, she had been informed that, if she did not disclose any
medications she had been taking before the test, she could be rejected for employment. As
revealed by these facts, the plaintiff was unsympathetic.
The facts played a similar role in Caputo, where the court emphasized that the re-
sults of the test were communicated to a company doctor rather than a layperson:
Moreover, even if we were to agree that the defendant owed plaintiff some sort of
duty to assure that the employer understood that the numerical result was a "weak"
positive and, therefore, might not indicate substance abuse, we conclude that the
fact that the report was transmitted to an employee at Air Products who bore the ti-
tle "doctor" discharges any such hypothetical duty in that, as a matter of law, a rea-
sonably prudent testing laboratory could thereby assume that the test results would
be appropriately reviewed by knowledgeable medical personnel.
Caputo, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 2191 at *10. Many employers and laboratories choose to
have results reviewed by a physician if the employer does not have one in-house. See note
47.
138 Tex 390, 159 SW2d 109 (1942).
SmithKline, 903 SW2d at 353, citing Buchanan, 159 SW2d 109.
Buchanan, 159 SW2d at 110-11. This version of the duty to prevent injury to others
is unusual in its insistence that the dangerous situation be created negligently. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts imposes this duty whether the defendant has created the
situation innocently or negligently. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321 (1965).
SmithKline, 903 SW2d at 353.
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parent, the act creating the dangerous situation was someone's
failure to maintain the bridge properly. The court then analo-
gized drug testing laboratories to the truck driver, stating that a
testing laboratory, like the truck driver, is a "mere bystander
who did not create the dangerous situation," because it is the
employer who requests the test and determines how it will be
used.90 Just as the truck driver could have prevented further in-
jury with a warning, the laboratory could have prevented the
firing by giving the employer advice about the reliability of the
test. But in both cases, according to the court, the corrective
measure was optional, beyond the call of duty.9'
The court's use of the analogy is questionable, however. The
plaintiff in SmithKline could argue that after "creating a danger-
ous situation" by negligently conveying a false positive test re-
sult, the defendant had an opportunity to avoid injury by telling
plaintiffs employer that the result could have been caused by in-
gestion of poppy seeds. In practice, this warning would probably
occur simultaneously with communication of results, but the act
of mitigating the potential injury by warning that the result
might not reflect drug use could be seen in some cases as a
measure taken to mitigate the results of previous negligence.
Typically, though, "false positives" based on ingestion of sub-
stances, like poppy seeds, whose metabolites confuse the drug
test, do not arise as a result of the testing laboratory's negligence
in handling specimens or analyzing results. Most tests currently
in use will confuse certain substances with illegal drugs even un-
der ideal testing circumstances. Thus, a warning to the employer
or worker is not a measure taken to mitigate past negligence, but
an attempt to provide relevant information.
6. Simple negligence.
The court in Willis also considered simple negligence liability
and denied recovery on the basis of an "Erie prediction" of state
law; the court did not offer an independent analysis of the issues
involved.92 The plaintiff was tested for drugs at'the request of his
' Id.
91 Id.
Willis, 61 F3d at 315-16, citing SmithKline, 903 SW2d 347. This opinion superseded
a previous opinion finding liability, which was denounced in SmithKline as a faulty Erie
prediction for two reasons. First, the court relied upon a Texas Court of Appeals decision
over which the Supreme Court of Texas had granted certiorari, suggesting that the opin-
ion's statement of Texas law might not be accurate. Second, the decision considered the
question of "duty to warn," rather than negligence liability, and explicitly refrained from
deciding the negligence question. SmithKline, 903 SW2d at 352.
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employer, DuPont, and received a false positive test result. Be-
tween early August, 1990, when defendant Roche gave DuPont
the result, and November 2, 1990, when Roche informed DuPont
that the result was a false positive, the plaintiff was placed on
restrictive work duty, sent to a physician, required to attend
counseling, and required to receive follow-up tests.93
In analyzing the question whether Roche owed the plaintiff a
duty to use reasonable care in handling his test, the court relied
upon SmithKline for its holding that no duty of care toward the
worker in this context exists in Texas.94 Although the Fifth Cir-
cuit had previously found that a duty did exist, it withdrew that
earlier and more detailed opinion and replaced it with a cursory
finding of no liability after the Supreme Court of Texas in
SmithKline denounced its previous ruling as an unsound Erie
prediction. 5
While the second Willis opinion provides little analysis, and
no Texas state court has considered the issue of simple negli-
gence, the Texas Supreme Court's caustic rejection of the Fifth
Circuit's initial opinion strongly suggests that no duty of reason-
able care exists in Texas.
Although the Texas Supreme Court claimed not to consider
whether a general duty of care exists, it followed its jibe at the
Willis opinion with a brief analysis of cases involving negligent
performance of polygraph tests. The court conceded that a few
courts had imposed a duty of reasonable care on polygraph test-
ers for foreseeable effects on plaintiffs' employment opportuni-
ties, but found the opinion in Hall v UPS,96 a New York Court of
Appeals decision finding no duty, authoritative. It dismissed a
contrary holding by the Arkansas Supreme Court, the only other
court of last resort to consider the issue, because "the grounds
[were] not clear."97
Willis, 61 F3d at 314.
Id at 316.
"And Willis is based solely, and erroneously, on the court of appeals' decision in the
case now before us. The issues in the two cases are simply not the same. (Curiously, the
Fifth Circuit did not regard this Court's having agreed to review the court of appeals' de-
cision as relevant in evaluating its precedential value.)" SmithKline, 903 SW2d at 352
(citation omitted).
76 NY2d 27, 556 NYS2d 21, 26 (1990).
SmithKline, 903 SW2d at 352. The court's insistence on looking only to courts of
last resort seems odd in the context of polygraph testing, which, like drug testing, re-
mains an unsettled legal issue. As the court admitted, a number of lower courts have con-
sidered the issue, the majority coming out in favor of polygraph testing. Id, citing Ellis v
Buckley, 790 P2d 875, 877 (Colo Ct App 1989); Lawson v Howmet Aluminum Corp, 449
NE2d 1172, 1177 (Ind Ct App 1983); Zampatori v United Parcel Service, 125 Misc2d 405,
479 NYS2d 470, 473-74 (NY Sup Ct 1984). In addition, the Hall opinion on which the
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III. PRIVITY: INAPPROPRIATE FOR ACCOUNTANTS AND
INAPPROPRIATE FOR DRUG TESTING LABORATORIES
Part I of this Comment argued that absent any concerns
based on precedent, drug testing laboratories should be held li-
able for their negligence. Part II demonstrated that courts did
not always find liability, but they did not clearly articulate the
objections to liability. This Part will examine accountants' liabil-
ity cases to identify a possible concern-the traditional rules
against liability for purely economic loss except in privity of con-
tract-and suggest that these rules need not apply in every case.
It will argue that, although courts should not ignore these con-
cerns in the drug testing context, they should respond to them by
looking at the justifications for the traditional rule. Because
those justifications do not apply to drug testing laboratories, li-
ability for purely economic harm in the absence of privity is ap-
propriate.
Accountants' liability cases, like drug testing cases, involve
issues of privity and pure economic or emotional loss and provide
persuasive authority. Like drug testing laboratories, accountants
provide services with incidental benefits to parties other than the
companies with whom they contract."8 In fact, accounting firms
often have no idea who will be relying on their reports, which
they perform based on analysis of the audited company and pro-
vide directly to the company. As in the case of drug testing, the
harm caused by a negligent audit report is purely economic, and
may often result from negligence rather than intentional misrep-
resentation." Thus, accountants' liability cases are strongly
analogous to drug testing laboratory liability cases. As the fol-
lowing discussion demonstrates, courts will impose liability for
purely economic loss when they are convinced that unlimited or
unforeseeable liability will not result.
In the early case of Ultramares Corp v Touche, New York's
highest court established a rule requiring contractual privity for
accountants' liability. " This remains the law today in New York
court relied emphasized that federal legislation, the Federal Worker Polygraph Protection
Act, regulates polygraph testing. According to the Hall court, the existence of such regu-
lation suggests that no additional state protections should be afforded. Hall, 555 NE2d at
278 (finding that federal polygraph testing legislation "greatly diminishes the strength of
the arguments for recognizing a new tort remedy at the state level").
" The audit report with an "unqualified opinion.., gives the financial statements the
credibility that clients and third parties seek through the audit process." Ronald A. Schy,
Privity and Accountants' Liability, 16 Sec Reg L J 54, 56 (1988).
Id.
255 NY 170, 174 NE 441, 444 (1931) (Cardozo opinion), cited in Schy, 16 Sec Reg L
J at 58 (cited in note 98).
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and other states.' A more recent case stated that liability in the
accounting context for parties not in privity requires knowledge
by the accounting firm of the purpose to which the report would
be put, that the purpose include intended reliance by known
third parties, and that the accountants conduct themselves in
such a way that reveals their awareness of the parties' reli-
ance."2 California and several other states have embraced a dif-
ferent standard, however, allowing damages to all "reasonably
foreseeable" users of audited financial statements. 0 3
One major element separates accountants' liability plaintiffs
from victims of inaccurate drug tests: investors rely upon audited
financial statements.' Should this factor be important? As a le-
gal matter, it allows .plaintiffs to use the "foreseeable reliance"
exception to privity in contract claims. However, courts should
not require reliance where liability is otherwise limited. The de-
velopment of accountants' liability law illustrates that courts will
not impose liability for unforeseeable plaintiffs or unforeseeable
harms, but will impose liability for harm that accountants could
reasonably expect to cause by their negligence. Since drug testing
laboratories are perfectly aware of the consequences of their neg-
ligence, the fact that the victim's employer relies, instead of the
worker, should not bar recovery. Courts' willingness to hold ac-
countants liable for their errors despite the economic nature of
the harm provides a useful basis for courts to do the same in the
drug testing context if they are satisfied that the resulting liabil-
ity will not be unlimited or unreasonable.
A. Brief History of Privity
The "Ultramares rule" of no recovery for economic loss with-
out contractual privity was based on a fear of unlimited liability
disproportionate to the harm caused.' 5 One aspect of the contrac-
tual relationship is that the parties will be able to contract
around liability by defining duties and limitations on penalties
"'See, for example, Schy, 16 See Reg L J at 58 (cited in note 98) (citing cases from
seven jurisdictions).
' Credit Alliance Corp v Arthur Andersen & Co, 65 NY2d 536, 493 NYS2d 435, 443
(1985), cited in Schy, 16 Sec Reg L J at 59 (cited in note 98).
" Schy, 16 Sec Reg L J at 59 (cited in note 98), citing H. Rosenblum, Inc v Adler, 93
NJ 324, 461 A2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v Timm, Schmidt & Co, 113 Wis 2d 376,
335 NW2d 351, 367 (1983); Bradford Sec Processing Serv v Plaza Bank & Trust, 653 P2d
188, 190-91 (Okla 1982); International Mortgage Co v John P Butler Accountancy Corp,
177 Cal App 3d 806, 223 Cal Rptr 218 (1986).
'
0 Schy, 16 Sec Reg L J at 56-57 (cited in note 98).
Ultramares, 174 NE at 444.
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for breach. In addition, the rule in Hadley v Baxendale'0 6 limits
recovery to damages that were reasonably foreseeable to the de-
fendant. These factors substantially limit the parties' liability;
both unforeseen plaintiffs and unforeseen damages will be disal-
lowed.
This, in turn, allows for pricing commensurate with potential
liability. The price does not take into account possible conse-
quences for third parties, but that result makes sense when the
possible third parties are an unidentified mass, with unidentified
harms, because the price increase for such massive and uncer-
tain liability would probably exceed the amount of damage actu-
ally caused and compensable. This is especially apparent when
one considers that a contract can have consequences of which the
parties to the contract, and any potentially affected third parties,
are unaware. A rule of unlimited liability would force contracting
parties, when determining the contract price, to consider the pos-
sibility that the contract might cause a remote third party to suf-
fer a loss. It is this concern for remoteness that has motivated
privity law in the accountants' liability context since Ultramares;
Justice Cardozo believed that a rule imposing "liability in an in-
determinate amount for an indeterminate time to an indetermi-
nate class" was "so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw
may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these
consequences."'0 7
But these concerns do not require absolute privity. Rather
they require conditions in which a contractor is aware of the kind
of harms (so she can take appropriate precautions) and amount
of potential damages (so she can price accurately) for which she
will be liable. Therefore the New York rule, the strongest in the
accountants' liability context, requires knowledge by the ac-
countant of the parties to whom he will be liable, and the pur-
poses for which his work will be used, with conduct of the ac-
countant used to demonstrate knowledge about the party's reli-
ance.
108
B. Concerns Behind Privity Do Not Preclude Liability in the
Drug Testing Context
Even under New York's strict test,0 9 the considerations that
motivate the privity rule do not apply here. Unlike accountants
1 156 Eng Rep 145 (1854).
' Ultramares, 174 NE at 444.
Schy, 16 Sec Reg L J at 58 (cited in note 98).
"See note 100 and accompanying text.
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who, in the absence of a privity rule, could be liable to an unlim-
ited number of people, drug testing laboratories have complete
control over the number of plaintiffs who may successfully sue
them: the number of employers contracted with, plus the number
of subjects tested. The kinds of harm caused by false positives
are apparent and are frequently and thoroughly discussed in
newspapers as well as medical journals."I
The only factor differentiating drug testing laboratories from
accountants is the possibility that a testing laboratory may not
be aware of the specific purpose of the test and the degree to
which the employer intends to rely upon it. This factor could sub-
stantially influence the damages for which a laboratory might be
held liable. But, because the party relying is also the party deal-
ing directly with the testing laboratory, obtaining that kind of in-
formation should not be difficult. Laboratories could easily
charge different prices for pre-employment screenings than for
tests of current workers, based on the availability of self-
publication or wrongful termination damages for those already
employed. The fact that the party relying upon the test is not the
one likely to incur substantial damages and to ultimately sue ac-
tually eases this burden on the testing laboratory, because it
makes estimating potential liability easier. Thus, abandoning the
privity requirement for drug testing laboratories performing
tests on workers will not lead to the kind of unlimited liability
Justice Cardozo feared.
Furthermore, liability for drug testing laboratories has a
significant factor that is absent in the accountants' liability con-
text. Auditors are not the cheapest cost avoiders of harm,"'
whereas drug testing laboratories are. This is because, in the ac-
counting context, the audited company can avoid harm most
cheaply by preparing accurate financial statements."' In con-
trast, employers can do nothing to protect against false positives,
while laboratories can do everything.
Although only a few courts so far have recognized a cause of
action for negligent infliction of pure economic loss, the avail-
ability of purely economic damages in the accountants' liability
scenario suggests that even courts that adhere to the rule bend it
in appropriate circumstances. They apparently do so because ac-
countants' liability does not present the kind of problem that the
rule was designed to avoid. Along with the privity requirement,
'See, for example, Spolar, Wash Post at A14 (cited in note 4).




limitations on purely economic losses are intended to prevent
unlimited liability."3 Again, the analogy to accountants' liability
suggests that the economic nature of the harm to false positive
victims poses no problems in this context.
CONCLUSION
Although courts addressing whether laboratories should be
held liable provide little guidance to commentators and other
courts, this Comment concludes that two sets of factors influence
their decisions. Courts finding liability have focused on a set of
policy factors that includes a concern for fairness to workers and
a desire for the efficient administration of drug tests. They im-
plement their concerns using the policy-oriented duty balancing
test. Unfortunately, none of the courts applying the balancing
test explicitly addresses concerns about purely economic harm or
the privity rule, both of which seem to be motivating decisions
against liability.
Courts denying liability in similar contexts focus on privity
and the lack of physical injury. Because of these tort principles,
courts have not found the simple balancing test appropriate, and
instead have forced plaintiffs to demonstrate intentional conduct.
Although some decisions make the rule against purely economic
loss for non-privity plaintiffs seem inflexible, the imposition of li-
ability for purely economic loss on accountants demonstrates that
it is not. Instead, the rule consists of a policy choice designed to
promote fairness and efficiency, just like the policy choices im-
plemented in Elliott and Stinson. In this case, fairness and effi-
ciency are met by the removal of the standard rule. Drug testing
laboratories do not need the protection of the rule because they
do not face unlimited liability to uncertain plaintiffs for unfore-
seeable injuries. Once the barrier of the rule against purely eco-
nomic loss without privity is removed, courts have every reason
to apply the duty balancing test and hold testing laboratories li-
able for their negligence. By doing so, courts will ensure a fair
and efficient solution to a serious workplace problem.
"'O'Brien, Note, 31 Ariz L Rev at 960 (cited in note 72), citing Cattle v Stockton Wa-
terworks Co, 10 LR-QB 453 (1875).
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